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Abstract: The author analyses Suárez’s 
theory of sound and hearing as presented 
in the sixth, eighth and ninth questions of 
the seventh disputation of the Jesuit’s Com-
mentary on Aristotle’s De anima. In the study, 
Suárez’s stances to the following issues are 
laid out: 1) the nature, cause and subject of 
sound; 2) the kinds of media of sound and 
the manner of its dilatation in medio; and 3) 
the organ of hearing. 
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Resumen: El autor analiza la teoría de Suá-
rez acerca del sonido y el oído tal como es 
presentada en las cuestiones sexta, octava 
y novena de la disputa VII del Comentario al 
De anima de Aristóteles. En este estudio se 
exponen las posiciones de Suárez sobre los 
siguientes temas: 1) la naturaleza, causa y 
sujeto del sonido; 2) los tipos de medio del 
sonido y la manera de su expansión in me-
dio; y 3) el órgano del oído.
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INTRODUCTION
F rom the viewpoints of history of philosophy, history of science and history of ideas, the sense of hearing was always regarded as “the second sense”.1 The majority of philosophers and sci-
entists since ancient times up to the modern period, with very few 
exceptions,2 considered aural perception to be “small brother” of 
visual perception. This evaluation can be confi rmed in many ways, 
fi rst of all from the origin of the corresponding sciences. Unlike op-
tics, which got its impetus from the work of the Arab scientist, math-
ematician and philosopher Alhazen (965-1040), acoustics, as physi-
ological and psychological exploration into the sense of hearing,3 
did not become a freestanding science until the 17th century when it 
started to get its shape in the works of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) 
and Marine Mersenne (1588-1648).4 In medieval and renaissance 
philosophy, the privilege of visio was commonly substantiated by 
the following reasons: light (lumen), as the object of vision, is the 
noblest quality of all the proper sensibles; sight attains a greater 
distance than hearing; unlike hearing, vision operates in no time; 
the so-called common sensibles, i.e., fi gure, magnitude, rest, motion 
and number, are best perceived by sight; the eye is the most perfect 
and admirable organ; etc.5 Despite this “visuocentric” approach in 
1. See the eponymous collection of essays Ch. BURNETT, M. BEND, P. GOUK (eds.), 
The Second Sense. Studies in Hearing and Musical Judgment from Antiquity to the Sev-
enteenth Century (The Warburg Institute, University of London, London, 1991).
2. An exception is the French philosopher and mathematician Charles de Bovelle 
(1479-1566). See T. FRAGENBERG, Auditus visu praestantior: Comparison of Hear-
ing and Vision in Charles de Bovelles’s Liber de sensibus, in Ch. BURNETT et al. (eds.), 
The Second Sense cit., 71-94.
3. The name of this new science was coined by Samuel Reyher in his De natura et 
iure auditus et soni, published in 1693. For this see M. WITTMANN, Vox atque so-
nus. Studien zur Rezeption der Aristotelischen Schrift „De anima“ und ihre Bedeutung 
für die Musiktheorie (Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft, Pfaffenweiler, 1987), Erster 
Band: Studien, 271. Of course, it cannot be denied that the mathematical study of 
harmony and research into architectural acoustics goes back to the ancient times 
with the names of Pythagoras and Vitruvius. Yet, acoustics as a complex psycho-
psychological enquiry emerged in the period of the scientifi c revolution in the 17th 
century.
4. Cf. Ch. BURNETT et al. (eds.), The Second Sense cit., 2.
5. All these and other arguments are commonplace in the theory of perception in the 
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the scholastic tradition, the second-class position of hearing did not 
mean that scientifi c and philosophical enquiries into hearing and 
sound (sonus) were of an entirely derivative character.6 The ontolog-
ical issue of the character of sonus constitutes an important challenge 
for the Aristotelian theory of perception, for at least two reasons. 
First, more than in the case of colour, some of Aristotle’s formula-
tions concerning the ontological status of sound seem to suggest a 
reductionist conception of sound. Accordingly, the proper sensible 
of hearing is to be reduced to the common sensible, namely to the 
motion of air.7 Second, in De anima, Aristotle is clear that sound in 
actu, as in its subject, resides not in the sensibles themselves, which 
produce sound by mutual percussion, but only in air. In the sensibles 
it exists only in potentia.8 This statement can be taken as standing 
in tension to the Aristotelian claim according to which most of the 
real (patible) qualities of the external senses in actu indwell in the 
material substances of which they are accidents.9 
medieval and renaissance scholastic philosophy. The roots of this view can be found 
already in Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s Timaeus we read: “Vision, in my view, is 
the cause of the greatest benefi t to us, inasmuch as none of the accounts now given 
concerning the Universe would ever have been given if men had not seen the stars 
or the sun or the heaven.” PLATO, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9, transl. by W. R. M. 
Lamb (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; London, William Heinemann 
Ltd., 1925), Timaeus, 47a. In the famous passage in the prologue to Metaphysics 
Aristotle says: “… most of all [we esteem] the sense of sight … of all the senses sight 
best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions”, ARISTOTLE, Metaphys-
ics (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1933) 3, 980a24-8, 3. For a “cata-
logue” of the reasons for the priority of sight, and the second position of hearing, 
see F. SUÁREZ, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis “De anima”, in 
S. CASTELLOTE (ed.), Tomo 2 (Editorial Labor, Madrid, 1981) disp. VII, q. 16, nn. 
2-3, 764-8 (further only: DA VII, 16, 2-3, 764-8). 
6. Moreover, a certain aspiration to the leading status of hearing can be found already 
in Aristotle: “… hearing makes the largest contribution to wisdom. For discourse, 
which is the cause of learning, is so because it is audible … the blind are more 
intelligent than the deaf and the dumb”, ARISTOTLE, De sensu et sensato (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA; London, England, 2000) I, 437a11-17.
7. ARISTOTLE, De anima (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; London, Eng-
land, 2000) II. 8, 420b11-2: “… sound is a kind of motion of the air”; “…sound is 
held to be the motion of something travelling …”, De sensu et sensato, VI, 447a1-2.
8. “But the sound actually produced is of something striking against something else 
in a medium”, ARISTOTLE, De anima, II. 8, 419b4ff.
9. For these two challenges see also R. PASNAU: Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 184-6, 189; Sensible Qualities: 
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Suárez takes up these two challenges in DA VII, 6-9, where his 
theory of sound and hearing is systematically presented. The fact 
that a signifi cant part of DA VII entitled “De sensibus exterioribus 
in particulari” is devoted to the topic of sound and its propagation 
gives us evidence that Suárez was aware of a certain “regulation” 
of the dominance of the visual, which is nevertheless underway in 
DA VII. As we will see below, in these questions Suárez advocates 
what can be called a version of “Sonic Realism”.10 His realist view 
of sound seems to be based on two main commonsense statements. 
First, sounds are extramental, transient (successive) sensible qualities 
that supervene upon the vibratory movements of bodies disturbing 
the surrounding (medium of) air. Accordingly, they are not mental 
items. Second, although the primary subject and the proper medium 
of sonus is air, Suárez thinks that the primary subjects of sounds are 
the sound producing bodies, or more precisely, their pores, which 
are fi lled with air. Importantly, this hybrid theory, which combines 
the medial tenets and the distal theories of sound,11 is related to 
Suárez’s emphasis on “a locational view of sound”, which in his in-
terpretation is closely connected with the endorsement of the audi-
ble sensible species.12
The Case of Sound, “The Journal of The History of Philosophy” 38/1 (2000) 27-
40; What is Sound?, “The Philosophical Quarterly” 49/196 (1999) 310-324.
10. For the explicit endorsement of Sonic Realism and for the struggle against “The 
Tyranny of the Visual” in the recent analytical debate, see C. O’CALLAGHAN, 
Sounds (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). 
11. While the medial theories “construe sounds as features of the medium in which 
a sounding object and a hearer are immersed”, the distal theories identify sounds 
with “distal properties, processes or events in the medium inside (or at the surface 
of) sounding objects, or in the stuff of the sounding object”. For a panoramic 
classifi cation of various doctrines of sound according to the criterion of its spatial 
location, cf. R. CASATI, J. DOKIS, “Sounds”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Fall 2014 edition), E. N. ZALTA (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2014/entries/sounds/>, esp. 2. Medial Theories of Sound; 3. Distal Theories 
of Sound.
12. Anachronically speaking, a spatial account of sound can be regarded as being 
primarily focused against a non-locational view of sound, which was the view 
famously endorsed by Peter Frederick Strawson. In his Individuals Strawson says 
“Sounds … have no intrinsic spatial characteristics: such expressions as ‘to the left 
of’, ‘spatially above’, ‘nearer’, ‘farther’ have no intrinsically auditory signifi cance 
(…). A purely auditory concept of space… is an impossibility.”, P. F. STRAWSON, 
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In the fi rst two parts of my paper I will consider these two 
challenges related to the issues of the nature, cause and subject of 
sound. In the third part, I will present Suárez’s theory of the kinds 
of media in which sonus is dilated. Fourth, I will focus on the manner 
in which sound is spread in medio. More precisely, I will focus on the 
topic of the exact coordination of the natural and intentional modus 
propagandi and modus multiplicandi of sound in the medium. Fifth, I 
will complete my presentation with an outline of Suárez’s theory of 
the auditive organ. In conclusion, I will sum up the representative 
features of Suárez’s theory against the backdrop of his approach to 
Aristotle.13
NATURE AND CAUSE OF SOUND 
Suárez opens DA VII, 6 with the “defi nition” of sound: “(1) Sound 
is a sensible quality (2) coming forth from a violent percussion or 
from the division of a body (3) apt to receive it [this quality]”.14 Dis-
tinguishing three parts in it, in the fi rst part Suárez shows that sound 
is a qualitas passibilis, an accident of quality that can be “suffered” and 
Individual: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Methuen, London, 1959) 65. For 
a brief presentation of this view, see R. CASATI, J. DOKIS, “Sounds”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 4. Aspatial Theories. 
13. My treatment of Suárez’s aural theory will not be comprehensive. In the context 
of his DA VII, 6-9, devoted to hearing, I will focus only on the part introduced 
in scholastic manuals by the title “De sono”. Accordingly, I leave aside the seg-
ment called “De voce”, in which, among others, the famous phenomenon of echo 
is treated (DA VII, 7). Apart from this, I will not bring in ex professo any of the 
issues connected with the theory of perception, which Suárez examines in DA V 
and DA VI. I have elaborated them, e.g., the nature of sensible species and the 
principles of a perceptual act, elsewhere. See D. HEIDER, Suárezova teorie vzniku 
species sensibilis a kognitivního aktu v kontextu středověké a renesanční fi losofi e, “Or-
ganon F” 22/2 (2015) 229-249; D. HEIDER, Late Scholastic Debate About External 
and Internal Senses: In the Direction of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), forthcoming 
in: S. SCHMIDT (ed.), The History of Philosophy of Mind between 1300 and 1600 
(Routledge, London, 2017); Francisco de Toledo, Francisco Suárez, Manuel de Góis 
and Antonio Rubio on the Activity and Passivity of the External Senses, in D. HEI-
DER (ed.), Cognitive Psychology in Early Jesuit Scholasticism (Editiones Scholasticae, 
Neunkirchen-Seelscheid, 2016) 38-66, esp. 47-52.
14. “Sonus est qualitas sensibilis proveniens ex violenta percussione vel divisione in 
corpore apto ad recipiendum illum”, DA VI, 6, 1, 634.
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received by (in) the pertinent sense organ and in the corresponding 
power. Notoriously, the proper sensible object is (for most scholas-
tics) what distinguishes perceptual acts, which then differentiate the 
particular senses. Accordingly, sound is not reducible to the com-
mon sensible of motion. If it were, it could not differentiate the acts 
and powers since it could be sensed not only by hearing but by sight 
and touch as well. This would violate the ontological status of hear-
ing as a distinct power, which, again, would result in the revision of 
the established number of the external senses.15 Although Suárez is 
well aware of Aristotle’s statements suggestive of this reduction, the 
threat of a revision of the common view is the reason why he is quick 
to reject it. Sound cannot be reduced to the local motion of air since 
the “ratio” of motion is separable from the “ratio” of sound. If one 
(motion) exists without the other (sound), the former cannot consti-
tute the essence of the latter. In the context of the implicit dismissal 
of the Neoplatonic heavenly music (“the music of spheres”), Suárez 
exemplifi es this existence of one without the other by the example 
of the soundlessly moving planets. Concluding, sonus can be only a 
quality that somehow falls upon (accidere) the motion of air.16 
Having arrived at “the logical genus” of sonus (part 1), Suárez 
approaches the “specifi c difference” (part 2). Since a noncircular 
defi nition of the “differentia specifi ca” in unico verbo is impossible, 
Suárez gives “a causal defi nition”. In the causal context, Suárez men-
tions two models. First, sound is caused by the violent percussion of 
two bodies. On this model, employed by Aristotle, one can think of 
the example of a ringing bell or of the clapping of hands. Second, 
sound is produced by the division of a single object, say, by the 
tearing of paper.17 While in the fi rst model there is a thing struck 
(percussum), a striker (percutiens) and a medium, the second one op-
erates only with a single body in a medium. In line with Aristotle, 
15. DA VI, 6, 1, 634.
16. Ibidem.
17. Contrary to Aristotle, who only mentions the three-member model in De anima 
II, 8, Suárez, probably following Avicenna, adds a two-member model as well. 
For Avicenna’s innovation see Ch. BURNETT, Sound and its Perception in the Middle 
Ages, Ch. BURNETT, et al. (eds.), The Second Sense cit., 43-69, especially 52. 
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Suárez proceeds with the survey of the physical properties which the 
sound producing objects have to possess in order to produce sound. 
Besides violent motion (a slow motion cannot cause a noticeable 
sound), the most fi tting properties are smoothness, hollowness and 
concavity. These characteristics make objects truly sonorous.18
Further, Suárez addresses the issue of the cooperation of the 
agents productive of sound. How do the forcible contact of bodies 
and the motion of air causally (or only “conditionally”) concur with 
respect to the production of sound? In the reply, Suárez starts from 
the fact that the common sensible of motus cannot be regarded as 
the effi cient cause of the proper sensible of sonus since motion, like 
any other common sensible, is a less perfect quality than sound. Ac-
cording to the general “axiom” regulating Suárez’s Commentary on 
De anima as a whole, what is less perfect in the scala naturae cannot 
cause what is more perfect.19 This “maxim” is also the reason why 
Suárez so often speaks about the “harmony of the powers of the 
soul”, which interact not causally but indirectly (“a-causally”) by 
means of being rooted in the common soul. Clearly, this explanans 
is not applicable here. Instead, Suárez employs the topos of “latent 
quality”. Referring to the example of a projectile, say a stone, and 
the “latent” impulsive quality (qualitas impulsiva) imprinted to it, 
Suárez applies a similar ontological device in the case of the effi cient 
cause of sound too. This time, the quality is called sound generat-
ing quality. Contrary to the impulsive quality in the stone which 
moves the stone without the stone’s being in contact with, say, a 
(throwing) hand, Suárez locates this sound producing quality in the 
sound producing bodies. Strictly speaking, only this quality can be 
considered as the effi cient cause of sound. The motion of air can be 
seen at most as its necessary condition. Despite this “conditional” 
status, the motion of air is what makes sound a successive or tran-
sient entity, which “perdures” through its temporal parts. Unlike 
colour, sound does not have a fi xed and permanent being. It lasts 
18. DA VII, 6, 1, 636.
19. For the universal application of this “axiom” in Suárez’s Commentary on De ani-
ma, see D. HEIDER, Idea řádu a metodologie Suárezovy psychologie, “Studia Neoaris-
totelica”, Supplementum II (2015) 103-117.
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only as long as the motion of air is being produced by the percussing 
bodies.20
THE SUBJECT OF SOUND
Having explicated the fi rst two parts of the “defi nition” of sound, 
Suárez comes to the third part, which is related to the issue of the 
subject of sound. What is that body apt to receive sound — the 
sound producing sensible objects or air, commonly considered to be 
its medium? Aristotle’s view seems to be clear. As said above, at the 
beginning of De anima II, 8, Aristotle distinguishes between poten-
tial sound and actual sound. The colliding bodies are the subjects 
of sound only potentially since they rather are its effi cient cause. 
In actu sound inheres only in air.21 Since the subject of sound must 
possess the property of agitability, the subject must be, above all, 
air. Even our ordinary language (this argument is not employed by 
Suárez) seems to confi rm this conclusion: We say “Sound is fi lling 
in the air”, “Music fi lled the temple”, etc. On the other hand, Suárez 
repeatedly says that we just as much have a clear pre-theoretical in-
tuition for the opposite view.22 By hearing a certain sound we detect 
a place from which it comes. If we do not know where our mobile 
phone is, we ask someone to give us a ring. Consequently, sound 
cannot have an amorphous location in air but, at least for a while, it 
must be fi xed and located in the sensible object producing it. 
Suárez accounts for this conclusion by three arguments. First 
let us think of two different pairs of percussing bodies, both generat-
ing exactly the same motion (undulation) in air. We often experience 
that though both produce the same motion, the sounds produced 
by those two pairs of bodies are different. However, if the subject of 
20. DA VII, 6, 2, 636-8.
21. ARISTOTLE, De anima II, 8, 419b4ff, 109. 
22. For this stance and the incoherence of the standard view, according to which 
sounds exist in the medium, see R. PASNAU, Sensible Qualities cit., 36-40; What is 
Sound? cit., 311ff. According to Pasnau, we should adhere to the view that sound 
exists in the objects by which they were generated, and thus we should understand 
sounds in the manner of colours.
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sound was air, both strokes would have to produce the same sound. 
This is not the case, though. In order to explain it, we have to “fi x” 
sounds in the sound producing objects themselves. Second, if the 
subject of sound was air, the motion of air would have to be the 
full explanans of its quality, say loudness. Accordingly, a stronger 
percussion of air would have to produce a louder sound, a smaller 
stroke would have to lead to a more silent sound and an equal blow 
would have to result in an equal sound. Obviously, it need not be 
necessarily so. A smaller percussion of mallets on a cymbal can cause 
a louder sound than a stronger strike on, say, a cloth. This shows 
that their difference can be explained, above all, by the fact that the 
cymbal and the cloth, and not air, are the pertinent subjects. Third, 
like a sound produced by the violent discontinuation of parts of air 
exists in air, so sound generated by the tearing of paper or by the 
violent discontinuation of parts of the paper must exist in the paper 
itself as well. 23
As for most early Jesuits so for Suárez the common view is 
equal to the true opinion. The common view in this case is the fi rst 
opinion. Principally and primarily the quality of sound inheres in air 
since air is the kind of subject primarily moved by the percussion of 
sound producing bodies.24 The crucial strategy in his reply to the 
aforesaid arguments for the opposite view is the following: It is not 
only and primarily the adjacent or the “extrinsic” air what accounts 
for the variation in sound, it is also the shape of the bodies and, 
importantly, the “intrinsic” air that is contained in the pores of the 
percussing bodies to be considered in the explanation. Accordingly, 
the subject of sound will not be only the surrounding or the “ex-
trinsic” air but also the air inhering in the sound producing bodies 
themselves.25 Admitting this “kind” of air will save the phenomena 
connected with our intuition about the localization of sounds.26 
In the remaining paragraphs of DA VII, 6, Suárez also raises 
the issue whether, apart from air, also the other elements, such as 
23. DA VII, 6, 5, 642. 
24. DA VII, 6, 6, 644. 
25. This also implies the substantial qualifi cation of the fi rst view.
26. DA VII, 6, 7, 644-6.
DANIEL HEIDER
332 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 50/2 (2017) 323-344
water, can be the subjects of sound. Though, like Aristotle, Suárez 
ordinarily names only air, he in no way is about to restrict it to it. 
Not only air but also water, fi re and “washy” or “airy” mixtures such 
as clouds are the subjects of sound.27 Without giving any reasons for 
fi re and the “airy” mixtures, Suárez cites from Aristotle’s De Histo-
ria animalium to justify that also water is the subject of sound. In 
the eight chapter of the fourth book of this text Aristotle says that, 
besides air, water can also become the subject of sound. Fish swim-
ming at the bottom of the sea fl ee from oncoming ships and oars, 
which can be explained only if underwater they hear the sounds 
produced by the ships and oars.28 Suárez concludes that although 
Aristotle usually names only air, he is far from asserting that only 
air can be the subject of sound. What he is after is to say that air is 
its most fi t subject. 
KINDS OF MEDIUM
Suárez’s solution to the issue of the subject of sound determines his 
stance to the query about the medium, of which he says that it must 
be the plenum extended between the sound generating object and 
the auditory power.29 If sound can be produced in water, fi re and 
the “airy” mixtures, all being elements and mixtures of signifi cant 
tenuity, the same entities are to be conceived as media of sound too. 
Despite this obvious determination, Suárez adds two other (partial) 
analyses. First, although he concedes to the view that water is the 
subject of sound, he is also aware of Aristotle’s weak textual evidence 
in De anima for the claim about the “medial” character of water. 
Second, dealing with the issue of the “list” of the media of sound’s 
dilatation, Suárez asks whether terrestrial and most dense bodies 
(terrestria et densissima corpora) can transmit sound as well, or not.
27. DA VII, 6, 10, 648-650.
28. ARISTOTLE, History of animals, transl. A. L. Peck (Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA; London, England, 1970) book IV, cap. 8, 63, 533b4ff. This substanti-
ates not only the fact the water is the subject of sound but also that sound can be 
dilated in water as in its medio (for this see below).
29. Importantly, vacuum cannot be the transmitter of sound. See DA VII, 8, 668. 
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In the analysis of the fi rst topic, Suárez refers to the following 
passus from Aristotle’s De anima II, 8: 
The medium in the case of sound is air, but in the case of 
smell has no name; for air and water have certainly a common 
characteristic, which is present in both of them, and bears the 
same relation to that which emits smell as the transparent does 
to colour” (419a33-4). 
Here Aristotle differentiates between the medium of sound and that 
of smell by saying that while air and water are the kinds of media 
in which fragrances get propagated, air is the only medium for the 
spreading of sounds. Yet, provided that sound can be dilated also 
in water, as said in De historia animalium, this “locus sane diffi cilis” 
cannot be explained away by the above employed strategy that the 
reason why Aristotle mentions only air is to highlight its status of 
the best medium. In fact, fragrances can be best spread in air too, and 
yet Aristotle mentions water there as well.30 Interestingly, Suárez’s 
solution to the textual discrepancy is similar to the theory of Pietro 
d’Abano (1250-1316), laid out in his Expositio Problematum Aristo-
telis. For d’Abano sonus can be heard in water assuming that water 
has not entered the deeper parts of the percipient’s ear.31 If it has, it 
could not be heard. This makes also the difference from fragrances, 
which can be smelled even though water gets into the intrinsic parts 
of nose.32
The “medial” elements and mixtures must be of high “raritas”. 
Obviously, such “penetrability” does not exist in earthy objects. How-
ever, despite their density, which seems to point to a negative reply 
to the question, Suárez explicitly asks whether these objects can be-
30. DA VII, 8, 3, 664.
31. For this cf. Ch. BURNETT, Sound and its Perception in the Middle Ages, in Ch. BUR-
NETT et al. (ed.), The Second Sense cit., 43-70; 55. As regards the organ of hearing 
see Part 6. For another doctrinal affi nity with d’Abano concerning the qualitas 
dolorifera as the proper sensible of the sense of touch, see D. HEIDER, Suárez on 
Pain and Touch, forthcoming “Pensamiento”, 2017. 
32. DA VII, 8, 4, 664-6.
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come the medium of sound. As usual, he sides with the common view, 
which in this case is the negative reply. Nevertheless, in his typical 
“probabilistic balancing”, Suárez is not ignorant of the evidence for 
the affi rmative view as well. No matter how thick and nonporous 
walls (say) in a jail cell are, a prisoner, if attentive, can still (weakly and 
remotely) hear sounds coming from outside. This seems to lead to the 
inference that sounds, in principle, can penetrate the walls as well. 
However, the relevance of this example can be undermined by saying 
that there always are latent pores in earthy objects such as walls since 
there are no absolutely nonporous objects at all. Consequently, if a 
prisoner hears the sounds, it is because of these pores fi lled with air, 
with which the wall is “interspersed”. The real transmitter of sound 
is precisely this intrinsic air, not the element of earth. Suárez admits 
the probability of this reasoning but refuses to take it as “the slingshot 
argument” for principal impossibility of sound dilatation in earthy 
bodies. Until we have realized an experiment and experientia with ob-
jects composed of entirely nonporous materials, we are not allowed 
to draw that defi nitive conclusion. Consequently, the theory grant-
ing sound penetrability to those objects has its own probability. Yet, 
Suárez’s following fi nal word is more probable: Earthy bodies are not 
the medium of sound; dense bodies cannot transmit sound because 
sound is a res succesiva. As a transient being, sound is to be conveyed 
through its medium swiftly. Accordingly, its medium must be of such 
a composition as will enable quick dilatation. Clearly, earthy bodies 
are not of such composition.33 
WAYS OF PROPAGATION: REAL, OR INTENTIONAL, OR BOTH?
Unlike the topic of the kinds of media, the problem of ways (modi) of 
sound propagation was more controversial in the context of medi-
eval and renaissance philosophy. Does sonus alter (immutat) the me-
dium only realiter, or does it affect it only intentionaliter, or should 
we rather say that it is spread in air in both ways? Are sound and its 
intentional sensible species dilated in air in an instant, or in time? 
33. DA VII, 8, 5, 668.
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First of all it must be said that, like the mainstream of scholas-
tics, Suárez accepts the sensible species as the necessary “vehicle” 
securing the contact of the sound producing objects with the sense 
power.34 The sound producing objects do not send forth only the 
real qualities of sound, they also emit intentional species. Suárez 
conceives these species as material and divisible entities, the main 
function of which is to (virtually) represent the real qualities. Suárez 
is quick to deny the following two extreme views. On the fi rst one, 
sound gets spread in air only realiter. The sonorous objects stir air 
up to the organ, where, by means of a real alteration, they push 
along this organ and the power, in which, if attentive, the operation 
of hearing is elicited. According to a certain version of this view, real 
transmutation of the organ occurs only in the medium of air. Only 
intentional affection occurs in water. Since the audible species is a 
less perfect entity than the real quality of sound, it can better per-
vade a less thin medium such as water.35 On the second view, sound 
gets spread only intentionally in air. Sound cannot be transmitted 
realiter since it exists realiter only in the sonorous bodies. As said, 
this is not Suárez’s view. So it is not diffi cult to see him reject this 
second view. Considering Suárez’s general advocacy of intentional 
species, it is not surprising to see him reject also the fi rst alternative.
In his fi rst conclusion, Suárez states that sound can be multi-
plied intentionally both in air and in water.36 He elaborates three 
arguments for this upshot. 1) Sound can be heard at a great dis-
tance. However, it is diffi cult to envisage that we could hear it 
from that distance if sound travelled from there by altering the 
medium only naturally. It is more probable to assume that the act 
of hearing gets secured by means of the audible species multiplied 
in air. As a less perfect entity, the species is better disposed to be-
come the vehicle for overcoming that distance. 2) In “an argument 
from elimination”, Suárez asserts that the tenet of purely material 
multiplication basically admits of a twofold exposition. According 
34. See DA V, 1, 282-296.
35. For Suárez’s theory of sensible species, see DA V, 2, 282-340; as regards its less 
perfect, vestigial, character see DA VI, 2, 6, 474-6.
36. DA VII, 8, 7, 670. 
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to the fi rst one, sound is transmitted to ears as a numerically one 
entity moving as a sort of a fl ying arrow in air. According to the 
second one, the ear is immediately affected by the sound lying next 
to it. This sound is the last one in the series of successive parts of 
sound, which are multiplied in air. Neither of the interpretations 
is actually tenable for Suárez. Let us think of the situation of two 
men standing in markedly different places, who are listening to 
an identical sound or a piece of music. The materialist interpreta-
tion seems to be less justifi ed in this case. In line with it, we would 
have to say that the numerically one part of air actually “bilocates” 
in different places. However, at least in the natural order, this is 
not possible. If the second option were plausible, it would have 
to be said that we hear not the original sound, produced by the 
sound generating bodies, but only the last sound in the series that 
touches a listener’s ear.37 However, this is at variance with the 
claim about our ability to trace a sound back to its “original place”. 
Concluding, there is no other way how to meet the pre-theoretical 
intuition than to postulate the intentional multiplication of the 
audible species. 3) As said, sound, as the other sensibles, is the 
proper per se sensible. Like colour, it can “ex se” alter the sense 
power without being in physical contact with it. Thus, sound has 
to be multiplicative of its intentional species. 
When having reached the upshot about the multiplication of 
the species, Suárez asks the question about its beginning. If one of 
the main reasons for introducing the species was audibility at a great 
distance, it can be claimed that the audible species do not start the 
multiplication until the propagation of real sound is ended. Then 
in fact it is only the intentional emission securing transmission of 
sonus to the farther places. Suárez denies this view. He makes clear 
that the intentional multiplication starts at the same time with the 
real dilatation.38 Again, Suárez employs the argument “from the lo-
37. This statement would amount to what is today called a proximal theory of sound. 
According to this theory sounds are construed as being located only at the bodily 
surface of the hearer. For this see R. CASATI, J. DOKIS, “Sounds”, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 4. Proximal Theories of Sound. 
38. DA VII, 8, 8, 672.
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calization of sound”. If we are to be able to “localize” the place of 
the origin of a sound, the intentional multiplication, essential for 
the elicitation of a perceptual act, must take place ab initio. Since at 
the very outset of its existence sonus is the proper sensible object of 
hearing, so from its very start it must be multiplicative of its audible 
species. Last but not least, the quality of sound is a natural agent that 
multiplies its species “wherever” and “whenever” it is.39 
It may be said that if the audible species are multiplied ab 
initio, sound will have to be perceived immediately. As the case of 
visual species shows, the visual species is spread in the perspicuous 
medium in no time.40 Suárez does not assent to this analogy. The 
“timeless” multiplication of sound jars with our experience. At fi rst 
we see the contact of two bodies, only then we perceive the sound 
caused by the violent percussion of the bodies. First we see a light-
ening, only then we hear a thunderclap. Unlike the visual species, 
the time lapse in the case of the emission of the audible species is a 
concomitant feature.41 
However, considering this time lapse, the theory endorsing the 
multiplication of the species only from the point when the real mul-
tiplication ends seems to be better after all. This, of course, confl icts 
with Suárez’s abovementioned assertion about the multiplication 
of species ab initio. This concept of the propagation of the species 
from the beginning seems to lead to the conclusion that we can hear 
immediately, however. This dilemma can be seen as being “rooted” 
already in Aristotle. On one hand, in De sensu et sensato, he declares 
that sound spreads by means of kinésis including the time lapse.42 On 
the other hand, considering hearing as the paradigm of sensation in 
De anima III, 2, Aristotle speaks about simultaneity in the activities 
of the sounding object and the actual hearing:
39. DA VII, 8, 8, 674.
40. The fact that, contrary to post-Einstein physics, light is emitted instantaneously 
was taken by the majority of scholastics as a matter of course. For SUÁREZ see DA 
VII, 1, 1, 552: “Lumen fi t in toto hemisphaerio in unico instanti”.
41. DA VII, 8, 8, 676. 
42. ARISTOTLE, De sensu et sensato VI, 446a22ff, 265.
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The activity of the sensible object and of the sensation is one 
and the same … in saying that they are the same, I mean the 
actual sound and the actual hearing … when that which has the 
power of hearing is exercising its power, and that which can 
sound is sounding, then the active hearing and the active sound 
occur together [hama; “at the same time”; D.H.]; we may call 
them respectively audition and sonance” (425b26-426a1). 
How does Suárez unravel this dilemma of temporality and imme-
diacy? How does he sail between the Scylla of instantaneous change, 
based on the claim of the simultaneous activities of the sonorous 
objects and actual perception of the power, and the Charybdis of the 
temporally extended multiplication, established in the propagation 
of the real quality of sound? 
Before introducing his (how else) conciliatory conclusion, 
Suárez mentions three (partly resuming) preliminaries. 1) When a 
sound is produced, the (concomitant) action of the multiplication of 
the audible species is set out in the same way. 2) An important agent 
in the process of the multiplication of the sensible is the size of the 
sensible object. Obviously, as a voluminous luminary source can be 
seen by sight at a greater distance than a smaller object, a louder 
sound can be spread further than a quieter one. 3) It is also neces-
sary to distinguish between two kinds of size, namely intensional 
and extensional size. A sound can be larger or smaller “intension-
ally” depending on the force by which it was produced. A sound 
can be larger or smaller “extensionally” if dilated through larger or 
smaller space. Both sizes are important factors to be considered in 
the context of refl ecting on the radius of sound’s intentional and real 
multiplication.43
In his reply, Suárez starts from a model of dilatation already 
coined by Vitruvius.44 This model is based on the water wave meta-
phor. A sound dilates in air in a manner similar to the circular waves 
43. DA VII, 8, 9, 676-8.
44. For Vitruvius’s employment of the (water) wave metaphor in the context of the 
propagation of sound see M. WITTMANN, op. cit., 77. 
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made by the ripples on water after a stone has been thrown into it. 
After the fi rst (highest) circle wave the process of multiplication be-
gins to fade and continues till the wave motion of water gets blended 
with the water table. In analogy to the water waves, the dilatation 
of sound also circumscribes circles of different dynamic up to the 
ultimate (smallest) sound wave. In an explicit reply to the aforesaid 
dilemma, Suárez considers a notional borderline, described by the 
circle formed by the ultimate sound wave. Within this circle two dif-
ferent activities are running, namely intentional and real multiplica-
tion of sound. Given the intensional size of a sound, we can assign 
a borderline at a certain point within the uttermost circle, within 
which we can perceive sounds immediately. This “timeless” percep-
tion within this circle will meet the “littera” of the abovementioned 
passage from De anima. On the other hand, so Suárez, beyond this 
boundary, the multiplication of sound and the audible species will 
proceed only successively, i.e., with a time lapse. In this case, as 
Aristotle affi rms in De sensu et sensato, the medium is affected before 
the sense power of hearing is. Consequently, multiplication of the 
species will require a noticeable time lapse.45
ORGAN OF HEARING
Suárez’s physiological treatment of the ear is much briefer than 
the other questions on sound and hearing in DA VII. Despite its 
brevity, the DA VII, 9, entitled Quodnam sit organum auditus et quae 
ipsa potentia, is an important treatise since it gives us a testimony to 
Suárez’s profi ciency in matters pertaining to physiology and to the 
hermeneutical art exemplifi ed by his exegesis of Aristotle as well. 
With respect to the previous analyses concerning the object 
and the medium of hearing, Suárez comes with the predictable 
claim that the organ of hearing is composed of the “airy” element.46
Importantly, the Jesuit distinguishes two kinds of ear, namely the 
external ear and the internal ear. While the function of the external 
45. DA VII, 8, 9, 678.
46. DA VII, 9, 1, 680-2. For Aristotle see also his De sensu et sensato II, 438b20-1.
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ear (in line with contemporary anatomy called the external acoustic 
meatus) is to protect the internal ear from damage by, say, a sud-
den gust of air, and thus to facilitate the reception of the species, 
it is the internal ear where the organ of hearing is to be placed. 
Contrary to Aristotle, who refers to the eardrum (derma) only en 
passant,47 Suárez underlines the signifi cance of this membranula in 
its role of the boundary line between the intrinsic and the extrinsic 
ear. What does the intrinsic ear look like? It makes up a sort of 
concave space where the auditory nerve leading from the brain, the 
root of the sensitive soul,48 fi nds its endpoint. This nerve supplies 
the organ with the animal spirits (spiritus animals) necessary for the 
power’s (vital) reception of the species. Although the external and 
the internal air fi lling the two ears are the same, the internal ear 
contains “vital air” and forms the correspondent “pars animata” or 
“pars spirituosa”. For Suárez the proper organ of hearing is pre-
cisely this “pars spirituosa”, covered by the thin membrane of ear-
drum stretched by the auditory ossicles.49 Although no anatomical 
evidence for this “pars spirituosa” is available, still, according to 
Suárez, it is to be regarded as its organ. Generally speaking, even 
though in his Commentary Suárez often follows the medical authori-
ties (Galen, Vesalius, Vallés), at times he seems to resist their strong 
naturalism. More precisely, sometimes he goes beyond it to explain 
the phenomena in line with the broad Aristotelian setting. Although 
contemporary anatomy had not detected this vital air in the inter-
nal ear, Suárez resolves its “anatomical absence” by claiming that 
it vanishes in death. Like in his analysis of the organ of vision,50 by 
assigning the sensorium of hearing to the vital air, Suárez ipso facto 
refuses to locate it in the auditory nerve. The auditory nerve is not 
the organ since it is earthy rather than airy.51
47. “When this [water enters the depth of an ear; D. H.] does occur, there is no hearing; 
nor again if the membrane is damaged”, ARISTOTLE, De anima II. 8, 420a14-5.
48. For this see DA VII, 6, 6, 528-544.
49. DA VII, 9, 2, 682.
50. For his rejection of the affi rmation, according to which the chiasm of the optical 
nerves is to be regarded as the proper organ of sight cf. DA VII, 5, 8, 632. 
51. DA VII, 9, 3, 684.
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As in the issue of the kinds of medium so in the question of 
the property of the extrinsic air, the exegesis of De anima II, 8 
stands in the centre of Suárez’s attention. In this chapter Aristo-
tle comes with the following formulation: “The air in the ears is 
lodged, so as to be unmoved, in order that it may accurately per-
ceive all differences of motion” (420a9-12). In this formulation, 
Aristotle suggests that the necessary property of the vital air in the 
intrinsic ear is its immobility. If it were in motion, sensorium could 
not perceive the oncoming sounds objectively. As the translucent 
(as far as colours are concerned neutral) nature of the crystalline 
humour in the pupil makes the pupil (objectively) receptive of the 
visual species, so the immobility of air makes the organ of hearing 
suitable for the (objective) reception of the audible species. But 
only a few lines below Aristotle comes with a second formulation: 
“… the air in the ears always moves with a special motion of its 
own” (420a16-7), which seems to give evidence of contrary sen-
tences in one paragraph of Aristotle’s text. How does Suárez, the 
philosophical conciliator, harmonize them? Of which ear does Ar-
istotle, as a matter of fact, speak? In an untypically less clear para-
graph, Suárez at fi rst appears to refer to the sensorium proper, i.e., 
to the intrinsic ear covered by the eardrum. Nevertheless, later on 
he inconspicuously moves to the external ear, which, rather than 
the organ, is the (adjacent) medium. Suárez makes clear that if 
the operation of hearing is to function well, even this “medial air” 
of the external ear is to be de se immobile. When Aristotle speaks 
about the motion, so Suárez, he does not mean that this motion 
is a sign of its “essence” and proper functioning. Quite on the 
contrary, it is a manifestation of disorder. Suárez quotes from a 
passage from Aristotle’s De anima following the sentence quoted 
above: “… sound [coming from that “special motion of its own”; 
D. H.] comes from an outside source, and it is not a property of 
the ear”.52 Whisper in our ears is not a natural state, based on 
natural continuous motion of air whether in the external or in the 
internal ear. It is a symptom of the intrusion of foreign air coming 
52. ARISTOTLE, De anima II, 8, 420a17-8.
DANIEL HEIDER
342 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 50/2 (2017) 323-344
entirely from outside. As is well-known, this always happens if we 
press our fi ngers to our ears.53 
CONCLUSION
Suárez’s theory of aural perception is clearly Aristotle-oriented, 
especially with its emphasis on the teleological relatedness of the 
auditory power (organ) and its proper sensible (sound). The crucial 
text for Suárez is the eighth chapter “On Sound and Hearing” of 
Aristotle’s second book of De anima. The Aristotelian bearing is 
also the reason why Suárez does not consider issues connected with 
other traditions such as the Pythagorean-Platonic lore focused more 
on the mathematical explanation of sound and analysis of musical 
consonances.54 This also why Suárez’s approach can hardly be evalu-
ated as modern in the manner of connecting physics and mathemat-
ics, as was typical for the mechanistic philosophy of the 17th century. 
Suárez’s approach is substantially qualitative and “elementary” in 
the sense of assuming the physics of elements and of qualities and 
the metaphysics of intentional sensible species. 
Nevertheless, Suárez’s attitude to Aristotle is anything but 
slavish. All the questions of DA VII, 6-9, including the unanalyzed 
question “De voce” (DA VII, 8), confi rm Suárez’s overall methodol-
ogy of the De anima commentary, which amounts to a rational re-
construction of Aristotle’s text, rather than its close commentary.55 
The segment of DA VII analysed above confi rms this stance by the 
number of Suárez’s “detections” of doctrinal tensions in Aristotle’s 
texts. Beside Aristotle’s unsystematic pronouncements on the topic 
of dilatation of sound and the audible species in medio, Suárez dis-
covered doctrinal discrepancies also in the question of instantaneous 
versus successive multiplication of sound and the audible species; 
53. DA VII, 9, 4, 684-6.
54. For this tradition see briefl y Ch. BURNETT, Sound and its Perception in the Middle 
Ages, The Second sense cit., 54-5. 
55. For this claim cf. A. SIMMONS, Jesuit Aristotelian Education: The De anima Com-
mentaries, J. W. O’MALLEY et al. (eds.), The Jesuits: Culture, Learning and the Arts, 
1540-1773 (Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1999) 522-537.
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in the immutability contra moveability of air in the intrinsic and/or 
extrinsic air; in his oscillating formulations on the issue of kinds of 
medium of sound. In some of his conclusions, Suárez went even be-
yond Aristotle. I have in mind the statement that the percussion of 
two bodies constitutes only the necessary condition, and not the ef-
fi cient cause of the production of sound. According to the originally 
Neoplatonic axiom the less perfect, namely motion, cannot produce 
the more perfect, namely the quality of sound. Suárez is also well 
aware of the pre-theoretical intuition we have about the localiz-
ability of sounds in the sound producing objects. Not infrequently, 
this localization served him as a “regulative idea”, leading him to his 
theory of intrinsic (airy) pores in the sonorous objects conceived as 
the subjects of sound. Suárez also seems to transcend Aristotle in his 
claim about the crucial role of the membrane of eardrum conceived 
as the important demarcation line between the intrinsic ear (the 
sensorium proper) and the extrinsic ear. 
Besides the crucial authority of Aristotle and his Latin, Greek 
and Arabic commentators, an “authority” no less important for 
Suárez is “experience”.56 “This is in contradiction with our experi-
ence” is one of Suárez’s most frequent “non sequitur” in DA VII, 
6-9. Experience can often modify or revise the littera of Aristotle’s 
text. This can be seen in Suárez’s evaluation of the thesis about 
transmission of sounds by earthy bodies as of the probable view. 
Last but not least, I am sure that it would be interesting to compare 
the reservoir of Suárez’s and second scholastic experience about 
hearing and sound with the rich repository of the experience about 
the same topic in the works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Bacon, 
a contemporary of the Jesuit, whose philosophical world was sepa-
rated from that of Suárez by ages, deals at length with the issues of 
sound and hearing in his treatise “Historia soni et auditus” (1608) 
and in the chapter “Historia et inquisition prima de sono et auditu, 
et de forma soni, et latent processu soni; sive Sylva soni et auditus” 
56. For the role of experientia in Jesuit natural philosophy in the 16th and in the fi rst 
decades of the 17th century, see D. DES CHENE, Life’s form. Late Aristotelian Con-
ceptions of the Soul (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London, 2000) esp. 19-23.
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of his Sylva Sylvarum, or A Natural History in Ten Centuries (1626).57 
In both texts Bacon presents dozens of acoustic experiments, a sig-
nifi cant number of which is similar to the experientiae adduced by 
Aristotle and Suárez.58 However, this comparison has to be left for 
a different occasion. 59
57. For the fi rst treatise see F. BACON, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. VII, J. SPED-
DING, R. L. ELLIS, D. D. HEATH (eds.) (Hurd and Houghton, New York, 1864) 
187-222; as regards the second see F. BACON, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. IX, 
Opera philosophica (printed for C. and J. Rivington, London, 1826) 1-23. 
58. See M. WITTMANN, Vox atque sonus cit., 269-270. 
59. This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as 
the project GA ČR 14-37038G “Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy 
and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context”.
